We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the liquid welfare, a notion of efficiency for budget-constrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014) . We show that some of the known truthful mechanisms that bestapproximate the social welfare for Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders through demand query oracles can be adapted, so that they retain truthfulness and achieve asymptotically the same approximation guarantees for the liquid welfare. More specifically, for the problem of optimizing the liquid welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders, we obtain a universally truthful randomized O(log m)-approximate mechanism, where m is the number of items, by adapting the mechanism of Krysta and Vöcking (2012) .
Introduction
Imagine that you are a social planner wanting to auction-off the seats of a local stadium at an extremely wealthy neighborhood (i.e., people have no budget constraints for the seats) for a big concert. As a social planner, your goal is to allocate the seats in a way that maximizes (or, at least, approximates as closely as possible) the happiness of the people interested in these seats. However, different people have different seat preferences; some people are happy with two consecutive seats anywhere in the stadium, and some might want a whole row. Phrased in mechanism design language, this is a Combinatorial Auction, where you seek to optimize the social welfare by a truthful mechanism. Combinatorial Auctions, like the one above, appear in many AI-centric contexts (e.g., spectrum auctions, network routing auctions [22] , airport time-slot auctions [27] , etc.) and have been a central topic in the study of Multi-Agent Systems. They have also experienced a recent interest in the AI community with works employing ML algorithms to overcome standard complexity problems (e.g., [5, 6] ).
As if this problem was not hard enough to solve, imagine that you find out two unfortunate events; the stadium is in fact at a working-middle class neighborhood (i.e., people do have budget constraints) and your boss is concerned about the effect of these budget constraints on the potential revenue. Now, the objective function should balance between the willingness and the ability of the people to pay for their seats. Motivated by usual discrepancies between the auction participants' ability and willingness to pay, Dobzinski and Paes Leme [8] introduced the notion of liquid welfare, which is the minimum of an agent's budget and valuation for a bundle of goods. As such, maximizing the liquid welfare achieves a reasonable compromise between social efficiency and potential for revenue extraction (which is constrained by the budgets).
Problem Definition. More formally, a Combinatorial Auction (CA) consists of a set U of m items to be allocated to n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function v i : 2 U → R ≥0 . Valuation functions, v, are assumed to be non-decreasing, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ), for all S ⊆ T ⊆ U , and normalized v(∅) = 0. For the objective of social welfare (SW), the goal is to compute a partitioning S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of the set of items, U , that maximizes v(S) = n i=1 v i (S i ). For the objective of liquid welfare (LW), we assume that each bidder i also has a budget B i ∈ R ≥0 and the liquid welfare that can be extracted from agent i for each set of items S ⊆ U isv i (S) = min{v i (S), B i } 1 . Under this objective, the goal is to compute a partitioning S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of U that maximizes v(S) = n i=1v i (S i ). We focus on CAs with submodular or XOS bidders. A set function v : 2 U → R ≥0 is submodular if for every S, T ⊆ U , v
(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ) and subadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ).
A set function v is XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive, see [19] ) if there exist additive functions w k : 2 U → R ≥0 such that for every S ⊆ U , v(S) = max k {w k (S)}. The class of submodular functions is a proper subset of the class of XOS functions, which in turn is a proper subset of the class of subadditive functions.
Since bidder valuations have exponential size, a polynomial (in m and n) algorithm must have oracle access to them. A value query specifies a set S ⊆ U and receives the value v(S). A demand query, denoted by DQ(v, U, p), specifies a valuation function v, a set U of available items and a price p j for each available item j ∈ U , and receives the set (or bundle) S ⊆ U maximizing v(S)− j∈S p j , i.e., the set of available items that maximizes bidder's utility at these prices. For brevity, we often write p(S) = j∈S p j to denote the price of a bundle S. Demand queries are strictly more powerful than value queries. Value queries can be simulated by polynomially many demand queries, and in terms of communication cost, demand queries are exponentially stronger than value queries [3] . Our mechanisms are polynomial-time, given access to demand oracles, which in general can be NP-hard to compute.
Previous Work on Social Welfare
Truthful maximization of SW in CAs with submodular or XOS bidders has been a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, with many powerful results. Due to space restrictions, we only discuss results most relevant to our work. While discussing previous work below, we assume XOS bidders and polynomial-time randomized truthful mechanisms that approximate the SW, by accessing valuations through demand queries, unless mentioned otherwise.
In the worst-case setting, where we do not make any further assumptions on bidder valuations, Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [10] presented the first truthful mechanism with a non-trivial approximation guarantee of O(log 2 m). Dobzinski [12] improved the approximation ratio to O(log m log log m) for the more general class of subadditive valuations. Subsequently, Krysta and Vöcking [23] provided an elegant randomized online mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of O(log m) for XOS valuations. Dobzinski [14] broke the logarithmic barrier for XOS valuations, by providing an approximation guarantee of O( √ log m). We highlight that accessing valuations through demand queries is essential for these strong positive results. Dobzinski [13] proved that any truthful mechanism for submodular CAs with approximation ratio better than m 1 2 −ε must use exponentially many value queries.
In the Bayesian setting, bidder valuations are drawn as independent samples from a known distribution. Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] showed how to obtain item prices that provide a constant approximation ratio for XOS valuations. These results were significantly extended and strengthened in the recent work of Düetting et al. [15] , and a (truly) polynomial algorithm was provided as well.
Intuition, Main Ideas, and Contribution
Our aim is to extend these results to the objective of LW. To this end, we exploit the fact that most of the mechanisms above follow a simple pattern: first, by exploring either part of the instance in [23] or the knowledge about the valuation distribution in [20] , the mechanism computes appropriate (a.k.a. supporting) prices for all items. Then, these prices are "posted" to the bidders, who arrive one-by-one and select their utility-maximizing bundle, through a demand query, from the set of available items (see Algorithm 1).
The technical intuition behind the high level approach above is nicely explained in [14, Section 1.2]. Let O = (O 1 , . . . , O n ) be an optimal solution for the SW (in fact, any constant factor approximation suffices). The supporting price of item i in O is q j = w k ({j}), where w k is the additive valuation determining the value v i (O i ) (recall that valuation functions are XOS). Intuitively, q j is how much item j contributes to the social welfare of O. Then, a price of p j = q j /2 for each item j is appropriate in the sense that a constant approximation to v(O) can be obtained by letting the bidders arrive one-by-one, in an arbitrary order, and allocating to each bidder i her utility maximizing bundle, chosen from the set of available items by a demand query (see [14, Lemma 4.2] ).
Hence, approximating the SW by demand queries boils down to computing such prices p j . In the Bayesian setting, prices p j can be obtained by drawing n samples from the valuation distribution and computing the expected contribution of each item j to a constant factor approximation of the optimal allocation (see Section 3 and Lemma 3.4 in [20] ). Similarly, the idea of estimating the contribution of the items would work under some market uniformity assumption, as the one introduced in Definition 5.1. In the worst-case setting, if we assume integral and polynomiallybounded valuations (i.e., that max i {v i (U )} ≤ m d , for some constant d), a uniform price for all items selected at random from 1, 2, 4, 8, . . . , 2 d log m results in an logarithmic approximation ratio. Krysta and Vöcking [23] show how to estimate supporting prices online, by combining binary search and randomized rounding. Importantly, as long as each bidder does not affect the prices offered to her, this general approach results in (randomized, universally) truthful mechanisms.
Towards extending the above approach and results to the LW, our first observation (Lemma 3.1) is that if a valuation function v is submodular (resp. XOS), then the corresponding liquid val-uation functionv = min{v, B} is also submodular (resp. XOS). Then, one can directly use the mechanisms of e.g., [23, 14, 20] with valuation functionsv = min{v, B} and demand queries of the form: DQ(min{v, B}, U, p) (i.e., wrt. the liquid valuation of the bidders) and obtain the same approximation guarantees but now for the LW. However, the resulting mechanisms are no longer truthful; bidders still seek to maximize their utility (i.e., value minus price) from the bundle that they get, subject to their budget constraint, rather than their liquid utility (i.e., liquid value minus price). Specifically, given a set of items U available at prices p j , j ∈ U , a budget-constrained bidder i wants to receive the bundle S i = arg max S⊆U {v i (S) − p(S) | p(S) ≤ B i }, and might not be happy with the bundle S ′ i = arg max S⊆U {v i (S) − p(S)} computed by the demand query for the liquid valuation 2 .
To restore truthfulness, we replace demand queries with budget-constrained demand queries. A budget-constrained demand query, denoted by BCDQ(v, U, p, B), specifies a valuation function v, a set of available items U , a price p j for each j ∈ U and a budget B, and receives the set S ⊆ U maximizing v(S)−p(S), subject to p(S) ≤ B, i.e., the set of available items that maximizes bidder's utility subject to her budget constraint.
To establish the approximation ratio, we first observe that the fact that liquid valuations are XOS suffices for estimating supporting prices, as in previous work on the SW. Additionally, we show that the bundles allocated by BCDQ(v, U, p, B) approximately satisfy the efficiency guarantees on the liquid welfare and the liquid utility of the allocated bundles (see Lemma 3.3) . Specifically, we observe that the approximation guarantees of mechanisms for the SW mostly follow from the fact that a demand query DQ(v, U, p) guarantees that for the allocated bundle S and for any T ⊆ U ,
In Lemma 3.3, we show that a budgetconstrained demand query, BCDQ(v, U, p, B), guarantees that for the allocated bundle S and any T ⊆ U , (i) 2v(S) − p(S) ≥v(T ) − p(T ), and (ii)v(S) ≥v(T ) − p(T ). Using this property, we can prove the equivalent of [14, Lemma 4.2] and also the approximation guarantees of the mechanisms in Krysta and Vöcking [23] , Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] but for the LW.
Contribution. Formalizing the intuition above, we obtain (i) a randomized universally truthful mechanism that approximates the LW within a factor of O(log m) (Section 4), and (ii) a posted-price mechanism that approximates the LW within a constant factor when bidder valuations are drawn as independent samples from a known distribution (Section 6). Both mechanisms assume XOS bidder valuations; the former is based on the mechanism of Krysta and Vöcking [23] and the latter on the mechanism of Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] .
Motivated by large market assumptions often used in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (see e.g., [4, 18, 26] and the references therein), we introduce a competitive market assumption in Section 5. Competitive Markets are closer to practice, since they stand in between the stochastic and the worstcase settings, in terms of the assumptions made. The main idea is that when there is an abundance of bidders, even if we remove a random half of them, the optimal LW does not decrease by much. Then, computing supporting prices for all items based on a randomly chosen half of the bidders, and offering these prices through budget-constrained demand queries to the other half, yields a universally truthful mechanism that approximates LW within a constant factor (Theorem 5.5).
Conceptually, in this work, we present a general approach through which known truthful approximations to the SW, that access valuations through demand queries, can be adapted so that they retain truthfulness and achieve similar approximation guarantees for the LW. The important properties required are that liquid valuation functionsv belong to the same class as valuation functions v (proven for submodular, XOS and subadditive valuations), and that the efficiency guarantees of budget-constrained demand queries on liquid welfare and liquid utility are similar to the corresponding efficiency guarantees of standard demand queries for liquid valuations (proven for all classes of valuations functions). Indeed, applying this approach to the mechanism of Dobzinski [14] , we obtain a universally truthful mechanism that approximates the LW for CAs with XOS bidders within a factor of O( √ log m) (the details are omitted due to space constraints). Similarly, we can take advantage of the improved results of Düetting et al. [15] in the Bayesian setting. All the missing proofs can be found in the full version of the paper on [21] .
Previous Work on Liquid Welfare
Liquid welfare was introduced as an efficiency measure for auctions when bidders are budget constrained in [8] (since it was known that getting any non-trivial approximation for the SW in these cases is impossible) and it corresponds to the optimal revenue an omniscient seller could extract from the set of the bidders, had he known their valuations and their budgets. Moreover, Dobzinski and Paes Leme [8] proved a O(log n) (resp. (log 2 n))-approximation to the optimal LW for the case of a single divisible item and submodular (resp. subadditive) bidders. Dobzinski and Paes Leme [8] and Lu and Xiao [25] proved that the optimal LW can be approximated truthfully within constant factor for a single divisible good, additive bidder valuations and public budgets. Closer to our setting, Lu and Xiao [26] provided a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant factor approximation to the LW for multi-item auctions with divisible items, under a large market assumption. Under similar large market assumptions, Eden, Feldman, and Vardi [18] obtained mechanisms that approximate the optimal revenue within a constant factor for multi-unit online auctions with divisible and indivisible items, and a mechanism that achieves a constant approximation to the optimal LW for general valuations over divisible items. However, prior to our work, there was no work on approximating the LW in CAs (in fact, that was one of the open problems in [8] ).
Our work is remotely related to the literature of budget feasible mechanism design, a topic introduced by Singer [28] and studied in e.g., [11, 7, 2, 1, 29] . Budget feasible mechanism design focuses on payment optimization in reverse auctions, a setting almost orthogonal to the setting we consider in this work.
Notation and Preliminaries
The problem and most of the terminology and the notation are introduced in Section 1. In this section, we introduce some additional notation required for the technical part.
We use E[X] to denote the expectation of a random variable X and P[E] to denote the probability of an event E. Let OPT (resp. OPT) denote the optimal SW (resp. LW) 3 . For some ρ > 1, which may depend on n and m, we say that a mechanism is ρ-approximate for the optimal SW (resp. LW) if it produces an allocation S with ρ · v(S) ≥ OPT (resp. ρ ·v(S) ≥ OPT). 
With probability q, allocate S i to i and set U i+1 = U i \ S i . Otherwise, set U i+1 = U i .
6:
Update item prices to p (i+1) = (p
Let a social choice function f :V n → A, which maps the set of liquid valuation functions of the bidders,V : V × B, to an allocation, A, and a payment scheme q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) for this allocation. A deterministic mechanism is defined by the pair (f, q). Our mechanisms in this work are going to be randomized, i.e., they are probability distributions over deterministic mechanisms. The incentives desiderata for randomized mechanisms are usually either universal truthfulness (when for all the deterministic mechanisms, the bidders' dominant strategy is truthfulness) or truthfulness in expectation [9, 16] (when bidders' expected utilities are maximized under truthful reporting of their private information). In this work, we are focusing on the former, stronger notion; the one of universal truthfulness, under the bidders' budget constraints.
Definition 2.1 (Universal Truthfulness under Budget Constraints). Let (f ,q) be a randomized mechanism over a set of deterministic mechanisms
{(f 1 , q 1 ), . . . , (f k , q k )}. Mechanism (f ,q) is universally truthful if for all i ∈ [n], κ ∈ [k] and for any v ′ i and any B ′ i , such that q κ (v ′ i , v −i ) ≤ B ′ i and q κ (v i , v −i ) ≤ B i ,
it holds that:
v i (f κ (v i , B i , v −i , B −i )) − q κ (v i , B i , v −i , B −i ) ≥ v i (f κ (v ′ i , B ′ i , v −i , B −i )) − q κ (v ′ i , B ′ i , v −i , B −i )
Approach
First, we show that if the bidder valuations are submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive), then their liquid valuations are submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive) as well.
Lemma 3.1. Let v be a non-negative monotone submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive) function. Then, for any B ∈ R ≥0 ,v = min{v, B} is also monotone submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive).
In Algorithm 1, we present a universally truthful (since the prices offered to each bidder do not depend on her declaration and demand queries maximize bidders' utility) mechanism, which is a simplified version of the mechanism in [23] 
Proof. We will prove each claim of the lemma separately. For claim i), notice that if p(T ) > B, then the right hand side of the inequality will be negative and thus, the inequality trivially holds. So, we will focus on the case where p(T ) ≤ B. We distinguish the following cases:
Bundle T was considered at the time of the query and yet, the query returned set S.
(v(S) = B andv(T ) = B)
Then, the inequality trivially holds since: B ≥ B − p(T ) and prices are non-negative.
(v(S) = B andv(T ) = v(T ))
The inequality holds since:
(v(S) = v(S) andv(T ) = B)
Hence, B ≤ v(T ). Bundle T was considered at the time of the query and yet, the query returned set S.
This concludes our proof for claim i).
For claim ii), notice that since S is the set received from the BCDQ, then it is affordable:v(S) ≥ p(S). Adding this inequality to the inequality of claim i), we have that: 2v(S) − p(S) ≥v(T ) − p(T ).
Worst-Case Setting
For the worst-case instances, adapting appropriately our Core Mechanism, we present Algorithm 2 (based again, on the mechanism of [23] ). The only difference is that budget-constrained bidders in Algorithm 2 are restricted to using BCDQs, instead of DQs, thus making the mechanism universally truthful (see Section 3). Resembling the analysis of [23] , we show that for 1/q = Θ(log m), Algorithm 2 achieves an approximation ratio of O(log m) for the LW. First, we note that parameter 5 L is selected so that there exists only one bidder whose liquid valuation for U (weakly) exceeds it. 
for each bidder i = 1, . . . , n according to π do 4:
With probability q, allocate R i = S i to i and set U i+1 = U i \ S i . Otherwise, set U i+1 = U i , R i = ∅ .
6:
Update prices ∀j ∈ S i : p
We present a series of Lemmas that will lead us naturally to the proof of the Theorem. Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) and R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) the provisional and the final allocation of Algorithm 2 respectively. First, we provide two useful bounds onv(S). We find it important to also discuss an overselling variant of Algorithm 2. In the Overselling variant, allow us to assume that for Step 5 of Algorithm 2, q = 1 (i.e., S i is allocated to bidder i with certainty) and U i+1 = U i = U (thus the name of the variant). The Overselling variant allocates at most k = log(4m) + 2 copies of each item and collects a liquid welfare within a constant factor of the optimal LW. To see that, observe that for q = 1, after allocating k − 1 copies of some item j, j's price becomes L 4m 2 log(4m)+1 = 2L. Then, there is only one agent with liquid valuation larger than L who can get a copy of j. j be the number of copies of item j allocated just before bidder i arrives, and let ℓ j be the total number of copies of item j allocated by Algorithm 2 with q = 1. Then, using the fact that
. . , O n ) be the optimal allocation. From Lemma 3.3, we get that for each
where we use that the final price of each item is the largest one. Summing over all bidders, we have thatv(S) ≥v(O) − n i=1 j∈O i p j ≥ OPT − j∈U p j , where the last inequality uses the fact that the optimal solution is feasible and thus, each item is allocated at most once in O. Of course, the allocation S in Lemma 4.4 is infeasible, since it allocates a logarithmic number of copies of each item. The remedy is to use an allocation probability q = 1/Θ(log m). For such values of q, we can plug in the proof of [23, Lemma 6] (which just uses that the valuation functions are fractionally subadditive) and show that for each agent i and for all
We are now ready to conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
j , for any U i resulted from the outcome of the random coin flips. Therefore, 
Competitive Market
Borgs et al. [4] were the first ones to define a budget dominance parameter that corresponded to the ratio of the maximum budget of all the bidders to the value of the optimum SW in the context of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. More recently, Eden, Feldman, and Vardi [18] and Lu and Xiao [26] used similar notions of budget dominance 6 (termed large market assumptions) as a means to achieve constant factor approximation to the LW in multi-unit auctions and auctions with divisible items respectively. However, for the case of indivisible items, it is clear that the definition of a large market used in the previous cases, becomes almost void (see Appendix C for a discussion). Below, we first introduce our definition of Competitive Markets for indivisible goods and then, show how one can obtain a constant factor approximation of the optimal LW, when bidders have XOS liquid valuations. 
where by OPT T we denote the optimal LW achieved by bidders in set T.
and let T = [n] \ S. Then:
Proof. Let X S the event that OPT S ≥ 1 − ε 2 OPT and X T the event that OPT T ≥ 1 − ε 2 OPT. Then, we have:
where the inequality follows from the Union Bound.
We are now ready to state our Competitive Market mechanism that will be used for approximating the optimal LW. We note here that the greedy algorithm A is due to Lehmann, Lehmann, and Nisan [24] . Set p j = 1 2βv A S j , where β > 1 is a constant 5: end for 6: Fix an internal ordering of bidders in T, π, and set U 1 = U . 7: for each bidder i ∈ T arriving according to π do 8:
9:
Set U i+1 = U i \ S i .
10: end for
As usual, we denote S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) the final allocation from mechanism presented in Algorithm 3. Valuations of bidders are XOS (and so are the liquid valuations (Lemma 3.1)); let a i be the maximizing clause of S i in the liquid valuationv i of bidder i. Since a i 's are additive, for each bidder i and j ∈ S i let q j = a i ({j}). Notice that i∈[n]v (S i ) = j∈∪ i∈[n] S i q j . We denote by OPT T = j∈U q T j , where q T j is the contribution of item j in OPT T . We divide the set of all items U into two sets; the set of competitive items, denoted by C and the set of non-competitive items, denoted by C = M \ C. The following lemma upper bounds the contribution of non-competitive items in the optimal solution.
Proof. From Definition 5.1, it holds with constant probability (w.c.p) that:
Let S C ⊆ S be the set of the bidders that are allocated the non-competitive items from the greedy algorithm A when running on set S. Then, in the augmented set T ∪ S C , there exists an allocation
7 Allocation Q is realized by allocating all items in C to bidders in T that also had them in the OPT T allocation and all items in C to the bidders in S C that had them in the allocation of the greedy A. The claim is completed by submodularity.
and therefore we have w.c.p:
Re-arranging the latter and using the fact that
then, for the items in C it holds w.c.p that:
In the next Lemma, we prove a lower bound on the contribution of competitive items to the solution obtained by the greedy algorithm, with respect to OPT.
OPT.
Proof. Combining Inequality (2) and Lemma 5.3 we get that j∈Cv A S j ≤ βε 2(β−1) OPT. Algorithm A provides a 2-approximation to the optimal LW of set S [24] , so w.c.p we have:
Combining the last two equations, we get the result.
Theorem 5.5. The CM Algorithm is universally truthful and achieves, in expectation, a constant approximation to the optimal LW, i.e.,
Proof. Since the bidders that control the prices being posted belong to set S and they never get any item, it is their (weakly) dominant strategy to report their valuations and their budgets truthfully. Furthermore, the bidders that are buying under the said posted prices belong to set T and they make BCDQs, which we showed to be truthful. Finally, the bidders are uniformly at random split to sets S and T.
For each item j ∈ C we have q T j >v(A S j )/β. Therefore, there exists an allocation for bidders in T and items in C that is supported by prices p 1 , . . . , p m , where p j =v(A S j )/β. Thus, a modification of [14, Lemma 4.2] implies that if we we set p ′ j = p j /2, for each j ∈ C, and run a fixed price auction in T with prices p ′ 1 , . . . , p ′ m , we get thatv(S) ≥ j∈C p j /4. Using the latter, along with the prices of the items, we have that
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 5.4. Thus, we conclude that
Bayesian Setting
The Bayesian Setting offers a great middle ground between the unstructured worst-case instances and the very structured Competitive Markets. In this setting, let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be a profile of bidder valuations and B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) a profile of bidder budgets. Assume that the bidders' valuations are drawn independently from distributions V 1 , . . . , V n and the budgets from distributions B 1 , . . . , B n . For simplicity, let us assume that their liquid valuations are drawn independently from distributions D 1 , . . . , D n . We will denote by D = D 1 × . . . × D n the product distribution where liquid valuations profiles,v = (v 1 , . . . ,v n ), are independently drawn from.
We are going to show that the results presented in Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] can be extended for budget-constrained bidders. Specifically, we are going to show that, if liquid valuations are fractionally subadditive, then we can create appropriate prices such that, when presented to the bidders in a posted-price mechanism and bidders are making BCDQs, then we can obtain universally truthful constant-factor approximation mechanisms for the LW in Bayesian CAs. Our Lemma 6.2 establishes the existence of such appropriately scaled prices. The key component activating our results is that instead of reasoning about the utility achieved from the bundle purchased by bidder i (as received by the BCDQ), we instead have to use Lemma 3.3. We also note that using our techniques one could even achieve the better approximation guarantees presented by Düetting et al. [15] . Their analysis is significantly more complex, however, and we omit it in the interest of space. 
Conclusion
In real-life auctions, bidders are always constrained by budgets, which we tend to overlook due to the technical difficulties that they add. The role of budgets in welfare/revenue optimization is amplified in CAs, where bidders have richer valuations and hence, studying budgeted CAs is a step towards bridging the gap between the theory on truthful mechanism design for CAs and constraints faced in practice. In this work, we showed how the liquid welfare can be approximated in CAs where bidders are budget-constrained in three settings: worst-case, Competitive Markets and stochastic. The most meaningful question that arises from our work (apart, of course, from the ever existent one of lowering the approximation guarantee in worst-case instances) is related to the competitive markets. We conjecture that the condition that we provide can be made even weaker, and leave it to future research.
Finally, our results can also be used to extend a variety of already known results in CAs without budgets, to CAs with budget-constrained bidders. For example, Lemma 3.3 (with some changes in the constants of [17] ) implies a constant factor approximation for best response dynamics in XOS CAs with budgeted bidders, that apply after a single round of bid updates.
v(S) > B.
Let π t be a permutation, s.t. all items in S come first and let α i * be the maximizing function for set S, i.e. v(S) = α i * (S). Let j * be the last item in the permutation π t s.t. r:πt(r)≤πt(j * ) α i * ({r}) ≤ B. Then, r:πt(r)≤πt(j * ) β πt i * ({r}) = r:πt(r)≤πt(j * ) α i * ({r}). For the next items z ∈ S in permutation π t , we have β πt i * ({z}) = max{B − k:πt(k)<πt(z) α i ({k}), 0}. In fact, the first item after j * will complete the missing value, in order to have:
k:πt(k)≤πt(j * )+1 β πt i * ({j}) = B , and all subsequent items, q will have β πt i * ({q}) = 0. Therefore, j∈S β πt i * ({j}) = B.
• (subadditive) Let v be a monotone subadditive set function. We distinguish the following cases:
Then, we know for a fact thatv(S) = v(S) < B and that
, where the inequality comes from the subadditivity of v.
2. Ifv(S ∪ T ) = B < v(S ∪ T ). We have to further distinguish the following cases:
where the inequality comes from the non-negativity of the liquid valuation.
where the inequality again comes from the non-negativity of the liquid valuation.
, where the last inequality comes from the fact that v is subadditive.
B Supplementary Material for Section 4
We include below the core theorems that are used in order to derive the O( √ log m)-approximation to the LW, by adapting the techniques used by Dobzinski [14] . Proof. Let T ⊆ S. We want to show thatv(T ) ≥ p(T ). Ifv(T ) = v(T ), then the property holds, since S is strongly profitable for valuation v. Ifv(T ) = B, then, due to monotonicity ofv, 
Proof of Lemma B.2. We will follow closely the proof presented by Dobzinski [14] , changing the analysis only slightly when it is required to reason about the set returned from the BCDQ.
For every bidder i, let W i = ∪ i ′ <iαi ′ denote the set of competitive items that were allocated before bidder i arrives to the auction. Let OPT i = j∈(∪ i ′ ≥i α i ′ )\W i p j . Then, OPT 1 = j∈∪ i α i p j and OPT n+1 = 0. For every bidder i ∈ [n] it holds that W i+1 = W i +α i and that the allocation (∅, . . . , ∅, α i \ W i , α i+1 \ W i , . . . , α n \ W i ) is still supported by p 1 , . . . , p m . Thus,
Now notice that bidder i could buy set α i − W i which implies that the liquid valuation that he got from the set that was ultimately received by the BCDQ was lower bounded by:
Since the bidder had enough budget to buy setα i (otherwise, it would not have been received as the answer of the BCDQ) we have that:
Summing up Equations (5) and (6) and using Equation (4) we get:
which concludes our proof.
C Supplementary Material for Section 5.
Large Market Assumptions for Indivisible Items. Imagine, for example, a large market with m indivisible items and n bidders, s.t. B i ≤ OPT m·c for some large constant c > 1. The number of bidders who receive at least one item is at most m and therefore, OPT ≤ m · B max , which leads to B max ≤ B max /c, which is a contradiction. We note here also that one can get similar voidness results for the case where c < 1; imagine a market with n = m bidders and m items, where the valuations of the bidders for the items are v ii = 1, v ij = 0, j = i and B i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n]. Then, the optimal LW is OPT = mB i (achieved when bidder i gets item i). However, for any c < 1 it holds that B i ≤ B i /c, while the market that we have in this example is a very thin market.
In reality, the previous settings discussed in the literature possessed another crucial property, that made it possible for the large market assumption to enable the results about the constant factor approximation of the optimal LW. This property was the homogeneity of the goods being auctioned; every bidder wanted exactly the same item or at least some portion of every item. The homogeneity of the goods, coupled with the large market assumption, essentially established competitive markets.
D Supplementary Material for Section 6. D.1 Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6.2. We are going to follow the proof presented by Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] . For each j ∈ S i , we denote by LW j (v) := A i ({j}) (i.e., LW j (v) corresponds to the contribution of item j to the liquid welfare, under liquid valuation profilev), where A i (·) is the corresponding additive representative function for the set S i . From the definition of p j : 
Following exactly the same steps as in Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] we can rewrite the above as:
For the expected revenue, due to individual rationality of the bidders it holds that:
